Proper activity, preference, and the meaning of life by Mix, Lucas J.
Both popular and scientific definitions  of life must account for the possibility of the sub-
optimal operation of some function. Identifying the function in question and the criteria 
for optimality will be necessary steps  in crafting a definition that is  both intuitive and 
rigorous. I lay out a rule of thumb—the proper activity criterion—and a three-part 
typology of binary, range, and preference for understanding definitions  of life. The 
resolution of “optimal” function within a scientific framework presents  the central 
challenge to creating a successful definition of life. A brief history of definitions  of life 
and explanations of biological function is  presented to demonstrate the value of the 
typology. After analyzing three controversial cases—viruses, mules, and stars—I present 
three possible options  for resolution: vitalism, reductionism, and instrumentalism. Only 
by confronting the consequences  of each can we come to consensus  about what is 
necessary and desirable from a common definition.
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1. Introduction
The primary challenge for generating a useful scientific definition of life comes from competing 
concepts  of biological activity and our failure to make them explicit in our models. I set forth a three-part 
scheme for characterizing definitions  of life, identifying a binary (presence or absence of some activity), a 
range (of operations  for the activity), and a preference (for one end of the range). The three components 
together form a proper  activity in biology (Table 1). To be clear, I am not proposing that proper activity be 
adopted as  the best definition of life or even as  a desirable definition for life. Instead, I am arguing that some 
notion of proper activity already exists  within common scientific definitions. By making the implicit 
elements  explicit, the notion can be analyzed to see whether it is  useful and appropriate in the context of the 
biological sciences.
The preference component has  proved problematic historically. Prior to 1600, majority opinion was 
vitalist, holding that living things were ontologically different from the rest of the universe and governed by 
intrinsic, life-specific properties. Preference arose from internal sources, such as  the soul. Over the next few 
centuries, modern science adopted mechanical explanations  in place of vitalist explanations, replacing intrinsic 
properties with extrinsic universal forces acting on particles. A mechanical biology, however, was  not 
embraced until the early 20th century, in part due to the apparent purposefulness of living things. I trace the 
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history of metabolic and evolutionary definitions  of life over the last century as  they attempt to make proper 
activities consistent with mechanism. I also look at attempts in the late 20th century to explain the concept of 
function by appeals  to a proper activity. With this  groundwork in place, I address  three problematic cases  for 
definitions  of life and use the proper activity framework to show why different definitions  of life yield 
different answers  for each problematic case and what that reveals  about the continuing role of preference in 
our understanding of life. Finally, I look at vitalism and two non-vitalist approaches to preference that are 
currently competing within biology. Reductionism attempts  to make preference and life into objective 
products of universal forces  acting on matter. Instrumentalism claims preference, and consequently life, does 
Proper Activity
Activity with Range and Preference
Binary
Activity Present or Absent
Range
Of  Operation or Activity
Preference
For One End of  the Range (‘Optimum’)
Metabolism
maintaining or increasing 
order locally at the 
expense of  increased entropy
in the environment
(1) extent of  disequilibrium 
with environment
(2) length of  time at disequilibrium
(1) for greater disequilibrium 
(e.g., order, complexity)
(2) for longer periods (persistence)
Oparin storage of  potential energy in a 
suite of  biochemical reactions
quantity and density of  
energy in the system
for higher quantity and density
Schrödinger localization of  negative entropy length of  time to equilibrium for longer delay
Walker and Davies data processing processing speed faster processing
Nagel* self-regulation contribution to welfare 
of  organism or species
better contribution
Bigelow and Pargetter* survival propensity for persistence (“fitness”) for higher propensity
Evolution imperfect self-replication
(1) copy number
(2) copy number per generation
(3) copy speed
(4) copy fidelity
(1) for more copies
(2) for greater allele frequency 
in the population
(3) for faster replication
(4) for more accurate replication
Muller autocatalysis (of  genes) catalytic efficiency for greater efficiency
Joyce (‘NASA’) capability for Darwinian evolution fitness for higher fitness
Baross capacity for adaptation adaptation for better fit with the environment
Millikan*
propagation of  a type in tokens 
(“reproduction”) token number and fidelity
for more tokens functioning 
according to type
Neander* replication of  genes
success in survival and 
reproduction for success
Table 1 — Proper Activity Analysis of  Definitions of  Life. Proper activity is broken down into binary, range, and preference 
for ten authors. For metabolic and evolutionary definitions, a number of  possible ranges with attendant preferences are listed. 
“Efficiency” for the former and “fitness” for the latter are often invoked to indicate one or more of  each without clearly stating 
which. (See Sections 5.2.2 and 6.1 for discussion.) *These authors are not explicitly defining life, but rather addressing function. Nonetheless, they 
reveal a concept of  proper activity and, except Millikan, note a specifically biological proper activity.
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not exist objectively, though it may be a useful way of talking about the universe. I list the issues that need to 
be resolved in order for one of the definitions  or one of the concepts  of preference to become standard 
within biology. 
2. Classifying Definitions of  Life
Scientific definitions  of life can be characterized using a three-part typology that captures  an important 
aspect of life, but may present philosophical difficulties. I call this  aspect the “proper activity criterion”: we 
use “life” to describe things that may be more or less  effective at performing some activity we consider 
proper to them. This  activity can be optimized, but only some minimal level of the activity is  necessary. 
Thus, there are always  three categories  of activity operation: (i) active and functioning well, (ii) inactive or 
active and functioning poorly, and (iii) without activity. The poorly functioning category captures  the 
essential character of terms like sick, sterile, and maladaptive. The most extreme version of this  is  death. 
Dead things  were once living, while inanimate thing are simply not alive. Though “dead” and “inanimate” 
may be exchanged colloquially, they represent distinct concepts.
2.1 The Binary: An Activity
Evolutionary and metabolic definitions  invoke a binary condition: the presence (or absence) of an 
activity. That activity need not be, in and of itself, unique to life, but rather any type of change through 
time. I am using activity in a broad, non-technical way. Replication, movement, catalysis, fractionation, and 
degradation are all activities  associated with both living and non-living processes. Nuclear fusion, fission, and 
radiation are all activities  not associated with life. It is  unclear whether any activities  are uniquely biological 
because the definition of  “biological” remains unclear.
Metabolic definitions  assign life an activity related to maintaining or increasing order locally at the 
expense of increased entropy in the environment. Since stars  and crystals  have this  activity, most metabolic 
definitions  add some further qualifier. Evolutionary definitions  assign life an activity related to imperfect self-
replication. Since fire has  this  activity and many individual organisms do not; thus most evolutionary 
definitions  add some further qualifier. In both cases, it is  the nature of the qualifier that will cause difficulties. 
The concept of an activity alone does very little work. The need for qualifiers in both types of definition 
highlights  the need for something more to differentiate life from non-life. Many authors  have noted 
difficulties  that arise from simple binary definitions  of life (Bedau 2012b; Küppers  1990, 134; Mix 2009, 34). 
The answer, however, does  not lie in aggregating together multiple activities. Dyson (1985) and Bedau (2010) 
have made such proposals. Other attempts  to define life have included lists  of activities, some or all of which 
must be present. As  we will see, the difficult part of these definitions  lies  in the optimization of the activities. 
More activities simply make the definition more vague as each one usually requires its own modifiers. 
Some confusion arises  over whether the activity must be defined objectively. It might be essential (as 
Aristotle believed souls were), not essential but still objectively present (as  Monod [1972, 12] saw “invariant 
reproduction”), or simply attributed (as  Kant did with final causes  to organisms). This  question parallels  the 
vitalist-reductionist-instrumentalist divide that we will encounter later (Section 5.2). I take it for granted that 
both maintenance and replication are intended as objective non-essential activities  in most scientific 
definitions; however, the typology works  regardless. The question of objectivity will be wrapped up in the 
approach to preference (Section 2.3).1
2.2 The Range
Maintenance and replication both exist within multiple spectra. If order is  maintained, it may be kept 
closer to or farther from equilibrium with the environment and for shorter or longer periods of time. If 
objects  are copied, they may be copied slower or faster, in smaller or larger batches, and more or less 
accurately. These spectra, like the activities  they qualify, also exist for abiological activities. Radioisotopes, for 
example, decay with shorter and longer half-lives. Explicit definitions of life will need to address which range 
or ranges are relevant to the activity in question.
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2.3 The Preference
Work is  done in our definitions by the preference component. Both metabolic and evolutionary 
definitions  of life contain an appeal to optimum performance. More complex systems  farther from 
equilibrium for longer periods  constitute better maintenance. Persistence of a type for longer periods  and in 
greater number constitutes  better replication. The preference component is  obscured by our use of the term 
“life” for both poorly and optimally performing individuals. Nonetheless, the definitions  require that 
optimization be possible. They suggest that we will observe “dysfunctional” individuals, possessing the 
activity in question (binary), but at a lower level within the range than might be preferred. 
I propose an informal diagnostic tool when assessing “life” and “biological” function. We think of an 
object as  alive (or the product of life, including artifacts  and dead bodies) when we can imagine it operating 
better or worse than it observably does. We think of a function as  biological or artifactual when it can be 
optimized. An activity only becomes  a “proper activity,” useful as  a definition of life, once we attach a 
concept of “better.” Millikan (1984) and Neander (1995) have emphasized the importance of normativity in 
identifying “proper function,” which they see as  reducible to the effects  of natural selection (but see Davies 
2000 for an argument against). For them, preference reflects  normativity relative to some activity of the 
organism. The preference in question here is  for optimization of that activity. As  McLaughlin (2001) 
cogently points out, these are not the same question. I deal with this in more detail below (Section 4).
2.4 A Note on Artifacts
There is  a rich historical literature on artifacts, including their relationship to and derivation from living 
artificers. Artifacts  clearly have a proper activity, which is  derived from some organism. For my purposes, I 
include artifacts and all products  of life within the definition of life. Some reference to historical treatments, 
however, will be helpful (Table 2). 
Aristotle deals  with this  topic, curiously to modern ears, by claiming that nature is  more purposive than 
art (Parts of Animals I.1; Johnson 2005). Artifacts  have extrinsic accidental ends, while non-artifacts have 
intrinsic essential natures  (Physics II.1; Johnson 2005). Proper activity (the nutritive soul) is invoked to 
differentiate life from artifacts. Nature (physis) is  invoked to differentiate natural things like atoms  from 
artifacts. Kant (Critique of Judgment §64-65) makes a parallel but significantly different argument, defining 
artifacts  by means  of an external reason, alienating reason from nature, and associating final causes  with 
intent. The organismic quality with which he characterizes  “organisms” has  to do with a super-empirical a 
priori purposiveness ascribed to them by observers (Miller 2002). Proper activity is  an imposition of reason 
onto artifacts  and organisms. Monod (1972) claims  that artifacts  always  channel the purpose or project of 
the organism that made them. He thinks proper activity objectively differentiates organisms and their 
products from everything else. McLaughlin (2001) claims  that artifacts  have (intended) purposes, traits  of 
organisms  have (unintentional) functions, and organisms have neither. He wants  to separate the proper 
activities of  artifacts from the proper activities of  organisms based on intentionality.
All four authors, each with a radically different agenda, use the concept of artifact to amplify their own 
notion of proper activity: soul for Aristotle (Shields  2007, 2012), natural purpose for Kant, teleonomy for 
Monod, and the end of a “regress  of means  to ends” for McLaughlin. Common interpretations  of the first 
three have been vitalist, instrumentalist, and reductionist, respectively. Note also that the four authors  do not 
agree on what constitutes  an artifact. Monod’s  artifacts  can be produced by any living being, while Kant and 
McLaughlin’s artifacts require a rational artificer.
I am unconvinced that one can objectively differentiate between organisms  and their products. 
Technology, prostheses, hair, shells, symbioses, and waste products all serve some ends  relative to both 
reproductive and metabolic definitions  of life (Mix 2015). Thus  I am willing, for the moment, to include 
artifacts  (evidence of life) within my definitions  of life. Further qualifiers  may be added to separate the two 
categories, but I believe the question of  preferences is more fundamental.
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3. Historical Definitions of  Life
In the early 17th century, the study of the physical world began what would become a radical shift in 
perspective. René Descartes  and Pierre Gassendi proposed new models  of the universe that have been 
labeled “mechanical.” Descartes  explicitly rejected the idea of intrinsic natures, choosing to explain 
everything in terms  of particles  and external laws  (Garber 2002). Meanwhile, Gassendi rejected real 
qualities  and substantial forms (scholastic categories  for understanding Aristotle) in favor of colliding bodies 
in space (Osler 2010). A collection of similar philosophies  took on the name “mechanical” to reflect their 
opposition to the Aristotelian concept of intrinsic properties, including teleology. Aristotelian natural 
philosophy relied upon natures (physis) as  first principles. Aristotelian mechanics  (at least as  conceived by the 
scholastics) could be reduced to the action of universal laws  on simple matter (Garber 2002). Boyle states  it 
succinctly: “the phenomena of the world are physically produced by the mechanical properties  of the parts 
of matter; and that they operate upon one another by mechanical laws” (quoted in Mayr 1982, 313). The 
motion of  atoms under the influence of  universal forces should be enough to explain everything.
This intentional shift to a mechanical perspective voided the explanatory work done by Aristotle’s  final 
causes  in biology, reopening the question of how we are to understand living things. Descartes reduced 
animal souls  to mechanisms with neither sensation nor agency, but kept human souls  as  non-extended extra-
physical realities  (Osler 2010). Kant, as  we saw, privileged human attributions  of purpose. Haeckel invoked 
progressive biological laws  (Ruse 1996). Partly due to uncertainty over whether such explanations worked, 
the mechanical philosophy did not become the norm in biology until the late 19th and early 20th century. 
The shift occurs  with Darwin, Mendel, and significantly, the Modern Synthesis  (Ruse 1996). While scientific 
models  have moved from explicitly mechanical to mathematical, the rejection of intrinsic natures  remains. 
The question of exactly how we are to conceive of biological activities  within this  framework remains 
unresolved. Over the past century, scientific definitions  of life have included two prominent schools  of 
thought: metabolic and evolutionary (Chao 2000; Fleischaker 1990; Tirard et al. 2010; Walker and Davies 
2013).2 The activities  in question have remained the same, with extensive refinements  in how they are 
characterized. The preferences that make them proper activities remain controversial.
3.1 Metabolic Definitions
Modern scientific definitions  of life emerged in the 19th century with the recognition that physical 
particles  and laws  may be sufficient to explain life. It seemed clear by the mid-1800s that biological 
chemistry invoked the same elements  and forces  as  abiological chemistry (Haeckel 1900; Bernal 1967). 
Explicitly naturalistic definitions  of life were proposed by individuals  like Thomas Henry Huxley, but it 
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Representative Living Things Artifacts Non-living, Non-art
Aristotle intrinsic nature (physis/psyche) extrinsic ends intrinsic nature (physis)
Kant (natural) purpose ascribed (artificial) purpose ascribed no purpose ascribed
Monod objective project (teleonomy) objective project (teleonomy) no project
McLaughlin unintended purpose intended purpose no purpose
Table 2 — Uses of  Artifacts. See text for discussion.
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would take a synthesis  of work by Charles  Darwin, Gregor Mendel, and countless  physiologists to pinpoint 
exact mechanisms.
“Metabolism” represents  the complete suite of biochemical reactions  leading to growth and life. A 
metabolic definition of life identifies  the maintenance of that suite with “life.” Oparin and Haldane were 
among the first to invoke chemical metabolism as  the defining activity of living matter (Bernal 1967; 
Haldane 1929). Both thought energy was  more abundant on early Earth. Spontaneous generation cannot 
happen now but it could then, and present life represents potential energy trapped in metabolic systems.
In the earliest expressly thermodynamic definition of life, Erwin Schrödinger (1992) characterized life as 
avoiding equilibrium by “feeding” on negative entropy: “living matter evades  the decay to equilibrium…for 
a much longer period than we would expect [from] a piece of inanimate matter” (69). He admitted that the 
approach to equilibrium in abiological systems can take long periods, even centuries, making it somewhat 
difficult to specify an operational test of this  delay. How long is long enough to constitute life? Maynard 
Smith (1986), among others, commented on this  ambiguity. Nonetheless, Schrödinger provides  a clear 
metabolic definition of life with a binary (localization of negative entropy), a range (length of time to 
equilibrium), and a preference (for longer delay). Subsequent definitions  added significant details, but retain 
the central theme. Chyba and Macdonald (1995), invoking Küppers  (1990), put it succinctly: “Metabolism is 
then no more than the turnover of free energy that makes  it possible for a given system, compartmentalized 
or not, to avoid reverting to an equilibrium state of maximum entropy.” In other words, metabolism has 
been redefined from a chemical system to an energetic one.
More recently, metabolism has  been compared explicitly to computer technology to emphasize the work 
of proper activity. Dyson (1985), drawing on work by von Neumann, suggested an analogy to the hardware/
software dichotomy: a metabolic framework in which inheritable adaptive programs  can run. Others  appeal 
to biological programs  and algorithms  (Dennett 1995; Mayr 1961, 1982). Such thinking underlies  much 
modern work on life as  a metabolic network or information system (e.g., Alon 2007; Goldenfeld and Woese 
2007). Maintenance is  central, with a preference for optimized processing. Walker and Davies (2013) use 
explicit computer analogies. Within such a framework, the binary character of life is  a processing unit, the 
range is  processing speed, and the preference is  for higher speeds and robustness  in the system. Software 
returns  us to the life as  artifact theme, revealing that the most challenging aspect of our mechanical models 
has not gone away. Why are faster, more robust systems better?
3.2 Evolutionary Definitions
The story of modern evolutionary definitions starts  with Hagedoorn (1911). He spoke of “autocatalysts” 
that not only replicate themselves, but also facilitate the replication of other molecules.3 Drawing on his 
ideas, Troland (1917; see also Muller 1966) proposed the “enzyme theory of life” where nucleic acids act in 
both capacities as autocatalysts  and more broadly as enzymes. His  model provided a concrete unit of 
inheritance by which natural selection can occur. Muller (1926, 1966) fleshed out Troland’s ideas  in a way 
that becomes  recognizable as  a modern definition of life. He specifically set out the gene as minimal 
protoplasm or minimal life. He also identified the chromosomes  as  a location for genes. Autocatalysis 
provided a proper activity for life with catalytic efficiency as the preference.
Subsequent evolutionary definitions have substantially refined the details  of biochemical mechanisms  by 
which these processes  take place. The emphasis  has  shifted from chemical “autocatalysis” to organismic 
“replication” or “reproduction,” but the outlines  have remained the same for the last eighty years. The basic 
structure can be seen in Carl Sagan’s  Encyclopedia Britannica article on “Life” where he defines  it as  “a system 
capable of evolution by natural selection.” Whereas earlier authors  could think of a continuous  process  of 
autocatalysis  going on inside the protoplasm, Sagan and later authors  needed to account for the periodic, 
and occasionally dysfunctional, replication of whole organisms. It is  at this  point that mules and other sterile 
organisms  become problematic, as  well as  individuals  that might reproduce but have not. Hence the 
insertion of the word “capable.” The new emphasis  on organisms created difficulties  for an operational 
definition (Chyba and MacDonald 1995; Fleischaker 1990; Luisi 1998). How do you determine a capability 
when there is  no observed actuality? How do we understand the first replicator, capable of reproduction, but 
not the product of  selection?
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Multiple evolutionary definitions  exist, often with qualifications  such as  cellularity (to exclude viruses) or 
chemical composition (to exclude in silico replicators). One, perhaps the most popular, has  been called the 
NASA definition based on its  origins in the NASA Exobiology Program: “life is a self-sustained chemical 
system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution” (Benner 2010; Joyce 1994). More recent attempts  have 
emphasized the importance of inheritance, variation, and selection leading to adaptation (Bedau 2012a; 
Bedau and Packard 1992; Chao 2000; Maynard Smith 1986). “The canonical characteristics  of life are an 
inherent capacity to adapt to changing environmental conditions  and to increase in complexity by multiple 
mechanisms, but particularly by interactions  with other living organisms  (and, at least on Earth, also with 
viruses)” (Baross  2007, 218). This  shifts  the focus from a concrete activity—replication—to a potentiality or 
capacity for replication. The activity has become less concrete, while the preference remains undefined. 
The term fitness  has  explanatory value in biology to the precise extent that it is coupled to adaptation. 
Fitness reflects  better survival and reproduction. Though frequently expressed mathematically, it is  not clear 
that a single underlying concept exists  that captures  multiple scales (levels of selection), multiple time frames 
(short term and long term fitness), and the persistence of types  versus  tokens. Biologists  agree that fitness 
frames  the preference, but they do not agree about what fitness means. As  a measure of preferred suitability 
with an environment, the adaptive aspect of fitness  remains normative. Terms such as 
“maladaptive” (phenotype) and “deleterious” (mutation) suggest that biologists  do not view such changes 
neutrally. Failure to perform that function assigned by adaptation is  viewed as  a negative outcome (unless  it 
comes with a new and more adaptive consequence).
4. Functions in Biology
Philosophy of biology contains  an extensive literature on the meaning of function within biology. 
McLaughlin (2001) provides an excellent summary and commentary. While this  question does  not bear 
directly on the definition of life, it does  have important implications  for whether we view life through a 
vitalist, reductionist, or instrumentalist lens. My concept of proper activity closely mirrors  several concepts 
proposed for the discussion of function in biology. In broad strokes, many philosophers have attempted to 
naturalize teleology and normative function either by reducing them to products  of natural selection or 
instrumentalizing them relative to the capacity of some organism. As McLaughlin points  out, problems  arise 
for these chains of  reasoning, both of  which appear to be proper activities with a preference component.
4.1 Etiological Theories
In 1959, Hempel proposed “functional analysis” as an explication of how biological functions are 
explained objectively in terms  of their contribution to the welfare of an individual or group in which they 
occur (Hempel 1994). He believed this  elucidated the process  of self-regulation in organisms, but could not 
provide a causal explanation. His  successors  were more ambitious  and their positions have been called 
etiological because they attempt to explain the causes  of functions, or teleological because they invoke a 
beneficiary (McLaughlin 2001). Larry Wright (1973, 1976), attempting to provide a mechanistic explanation 
of function, introduces  the notion of feedback. He defines  Z as  the function of X when “X is  there because it 
does  Z” and “Z is  a consequence of X’s being there.” His  beneficiary need not be an organism, but when it 
is, he invokes  the survival and reproduction of that organism as  the proper activity that justifies  a proper 
function. Michael Ruse (1971) is  both more explicit in his  framework and more savvy with respect to 
evolutionary theory. He explicitly defines  function in terms  of adaptation, which provides relative 
reproductive success  to the organism in which it occurs. Perhaps  better than any other author, Ruse has 
managed to present a reductionist etiology of function that explains  it via natural selection. I am 
unconvinced, however, that he has  successfully eliminated the inductive problem of extrapolating from that 
which was  adaptive in the past (or in another organism) to that which is  adaptive in the present. Millikan 
(1984) addressed this  problem with tokens and types. The normativity of a function in a token comes  from 
its  closeness  in function to the type from which it was  copied. Millikan calls  this  process  of copying types 
“reproduction,” intentionally coining a new usage of that word. Individual tokens  function properly and are 
adaptive when they function according to type. The proliferation of the type forms  the proper activity with a 
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preference for more tokens. This  analysis  allows  her to disentangle proximate and distal explanations  for 
proper functions. (This  was  Mayr’s  [1992] chief complaint about Ruse’s  analysis.) It also allows her to speak 
about beneficiaries  at many scales. Neander (1995) develops  this  reasoning further, explaining functions 
through an asymmetric series  of “by-relations.” Each proper function serves the proper activity—
contribution to gene replication in biology—through a series of intermediates. For example, “the frog’s  optic 
fibres contributed to gene replication by helping to feed the frog by helping the frog catch flies” (125). 
All of these etiological explanations  of biological function rest on a notion, explicit or implicit, of 
replication as  a proper activity with a preference for more copies; in other words, evolutionary definitions  of 
life. With the exception of Wright (and possibly Hempel), they all accept some form of preference but, 
through a mechanistic reduction of it to natural selection, believe they have eliminated the problem of 
teleology.
4.2 Dispositional Theories
In 1961 Ernst Nagel argued that every effect could be viewed as  a function when it contributes  to the 
“characteristic activity of the system” (McLaughlin 2001). This  is  called the dispositional approach to 
functions  because it focuses on what they do rather than how they came into existence. Nagel takes for 
granted that organisms have goals  and in almost all of his  examples  they relate to self-regulation. But he 
avoids  the question of what precisely these goals  are (Nagel 1977a, b). Other dispositional approaches  are 
less  sanguine. Cummins  (1975) attacks  both Nagel and Hempel on just this  question. If functions  can be 
defended by an appeal to their containing system, then where do the functions  of systems come from? If 
there is  a proper level of system for reference (e.g., genes, individuals, societies,…), what is  it? In the 
language of my analysis, if the functions  of traits  can be explained by appealing to the proper activity of 
organisms  (or genes, or types,...), where do proper activities  come from? More specifically, where does  the 
preference that makes the activity “proper” come from? Cummins  claims  that functional ascriptions  are 
always  relative to some proposed analytical exercise. The capacity of the heart to beat contributes  to the 
capacity of the body to make noise and also to the capacity of the vascular system to circulate blood. Like 
Kant, he sees  functions as  part of explanations, not part of nature. No proper activity is  necessary, though 
some activities are interesting and amenable to functional analysis. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) attempt to 
push this  closer to objectivity with a theory of propensity. They invoke the likelihood that a creature will 
survive in its  given habitat. The function of a trait reflects  those features  that increase the survival propensity 
of its  host, presumably in proportion to their own likelihood of having an impact. Every effect that might 
improve survival, no matter how small the chance, is  a function to some extent. Thus survival becomes  the 
proper activity of organisms  and higher fitness the preference. It remains  unclear why the survival of non-
organisms does not also generate functions.
Dispositional explanations  of biological function appeal to a range of proper activities, including self-
regulation, replication, and survival. Thus, it can be hard to characterize them as  appealing to one definition 
of life. They require different notions  of preference, but uniformly interpret them in an instrumentalist 
manner.
5. Future Definitions of  Life
There has  been surprisingly little progress  made in trying to define life scientifically. A framework was  in 
place by the late 19th century and an ever increasing amount of detail has  been added subsequently, but no 
consensus  has  been achieved. This  may have more to do with the problematic nature of preferences  within 
modern science than with any empirical problem, such as a lack of  observations or a lack of  theory.
The mechanical philosophy, including a rejection of intrinsic properties, has reigned in the physical 
sciences  for nearly five centuries. It was  not accepted in the biological sciences until the 20th century, 
however, perhaps  due to strong associations between organisms and goal directed behavior or teleology. The 
rejection of teleology (Mitra 1986; Osler 2010, 144; Ruse 1996, 410-455) proves  problematic for concepts  of 
proper activity, once considered essential for a definition of life. In De Anima, Aristotle argued that the soul 
was  not a dynamis, a capacity, but an energeion, a function in active use. Thus, the “entelechism” of Aristotle 
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and centuries of biology was  rejected. Modern science will allow for universal forces  but not for localized 
purpose.
Over the last century, we have identified two important processes  associated with life: evolution by 
natural selection and complex self-regulation. Each represents an activity associated with life that operates 
over a range of values. Those elements  of the definitions  are not problematic and have been steadily refined. 
Our definitions  also require, however, a preference component. Attempts  have been made to naturalize the 
preference component as  well, but they have met with mixed success, sometimes  because they were poorly 
characterized, other times because they represent deep philosophical disagreements.
5.1 Borderline Cases
The three-part characterization of definitions  of life as  a proper activity provides  insights  into why these 
disagreements exist and why they manifest in several popular borderline cases.
5.1.1 Ambivalent Binary – Viruses
There remains  great disagreement about what the primary activity of life should be, or even if there is 
one. Viruses  prove troubling because they possess  the proper activity of adaptive replication without the 
proper activity of self-regulation. Viruses  do not actively resist thermodynamic equilibrium with their 
environment, though they are copied and maintained by the metabolism of host cells. Nor do many 
consider them sufficiently complex to suffer sickness. Attribution of life may rest solidly and explicitly on 
which definition you use. It may also rest on our feeling that viral adaptation lacks  the value or dignity of 
animal adaptation. Categorization of viroids, virusoids, plasmids, and gene transfer agents  face similar 
problems.
5.1.2 Confusion of  Binary with Range – Mules
Other intermediate cases  suffer from the confusion of the binary and range components of a definition. 
Few biologists  question that mules are alive and yet they are frequently cited as  a case of an organism that 
cannot produce offspring. How can they then undergo Darwinian replication? The question here is  not 
simply one of adaptation versus replication. Rather, we think the mule has  a proper activity of organism 
level replication or reproduction, at which it fails. Mules  have almost all the normal mechanisms for 
reproduction, but meiosis  does  not work properly, resulting in no viable gametes. The mule ceases  to be an 
intermediate case once we recognize that its  proper activity need not be carried out well in order for us  to 
consider it alive.
Mules also highlight a composition problem regarding the definition of life. Just because meiosis  fails, 
does  not mean that mitosis  does. Cellular replication occurs  throughout the lifetime of a mule. The bias 
toward judging replication in terms  of the organism rather than the cell is  what leads  us  astray. There should 
be no question that mules  represent living colonies of cells, even if they might not represent living 
individuals.
5.1.3 Absent Preference – Stars
Finally, stars  highlight the importance of the preference component. They clearly meet many of the 
requirements for a classical metabolic definition of life. They drain the potential energy of a neighborhood 
in order to produce a complex, dynamic structure. They even produce energy in a form that organisms can 
feed on. They maintain an internal environment that allows  a unique series  of chemical reactions, which do 
not otherwise occur. Stars  also resemble replicators, producing both energetic (shock wave) and material 
(nucleosynthetic) components  contributing to the formation of other stars. They demonstrate a very weak 
form of inheritance, with more massive stars  leading to the formation of heavier elements  leading to more 
massive stars. 
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In spite of having a clear activity and range related to the activities  and ranges  usually associated with 
life, stars  are rarely presented as  alive. This  is  because we do not associate preferences  with them. Hotter and 
more massive stars are not considered better (or worse) than their siblings. Longer lasting stars are not 
lauded over shorter-lived stars. The closest we come to this  kind of view is  an instrumental preference for 
mid-range stars, which are more favorable for life (Mix 2009, 100-110).
I can think of many ways  by which one could judge success  for a star, but judgments  of this  kind are not 
made. Brown Dwarfs  are occasionally called “failed stars,” having insufficient mass  to support fusion, but no 
opprobrium or disquiet attaches  to such failure. No one says, “If only…” If such a lack is  objective, we have 
yet to characterize it clearly. If it is  merely instrumental taxonomy, then that will tell us  something interesting 
about ourselves, if  not about our stars.
5.2 Moving Forward
How can we move toward a consensus  definition of life? The ambiguous  concept of “better” contributes 
to the popularity of teleological explanations within (e.g., Pross  2005) and without (e.g., Nagel 2012) science 
and may not be compatible with methodological naturalism. I see this  as  the central obstacle in finding a 
definition of life that is  satisfactory, both intuitively and scientifically. Machery (2012) argues  that one cannot 
have it both ways: a definition of life must either be a scientific definition or a folk concept. On the contrary, 
I would argue that the purpose of a scientific definition must to be to construct a philosophically rigorous 
and empirically accountable definition that captures, to whatever extent possible, the folk concept. The 
general public may not think of H2O every time they think of water, but H2O accurately describes  the 
common features  of what they conceive. Scientists  are not in the business  of simply making things  up. Folk 
counterexamples  are posed to demonstrate that a given definition is  insufficiently close to satisfy some 
standard of usefulness. The question of sufficiency is  problematic, but hardly incomprehensible. No precise 
folk definition is  necessary. Nonetheless, the scientific desire for clear communication and accurate 
representation of the natural world suggests  that a better definition is  called for. In the meantime, specific 
scientific programs addressing the boundaries  of life in space and time require at least provisional definitions 
for life (Mix 2015). These definitions will need to account for preference in addition to binary and range.
Due to their invocation of optimum performance, proper activity definitions  may not constitute good 
definitions  from a scientific standpoint. How might optimum be defined objectively? The concepts  are, 
however, implicit in both popular and current scientific definitions and should be addressed. To be clear, I 
am not arguing that the task cannot be accomplished. Rather, it can be accomplished and proposals  have 
been made. One reason these have not been accepted is  that they rely on uncommon premises. Broadly, 
those premises take one of  three tacks (Table 3).
5.2.1 Vitalism
Preference within definitions  of life could represent the effects  of a life specific universal force. The 19th 
century witnessed a number of attempts  to reconcile biological value with modern objectivism by 
introducing a “life force” in some way parallel to gravity and other physical forces. Just as  gravity acts  on 
anything with mass, so the vital force acts on anything alive.
If we subscribe to the mechanical philosophy, then vitalism will require “vitality” to be expressed in 
terms of an external force and a relevant particle or property of a particle. Proposals  for a soul particle or 
elemental vitality have been proposed, from Lucretius’ “soul seed” (De Rerum Natura, book 3) to Teilhard’s 
“granular life” (1975: 92). Alternatively, one could propose vitality as  a property of quarks  or other 
fundamental particles. Coming from another angle, early modern biologists  proposed a number of vital 
forces  that push life forward (Ruse 2009). Notable examples  include Henri Bergeson’s  “élan vital” and 
Herbert Spencer’s “law of  organic progress.”
The vitalist position in science is  amenable to empirical verification, specifically in the form of potential 
vital energy—distinct from potential energy in some other form—being stored in a system. Unless or until 
such data appears, vitalism cannot be considered a valid option.
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5.2.2 Reductionism
Preference within definitions  of life may represent the movement of previously identified universal 
physical forces. The most popular solution reduces biological function and biological value to a product of 
universal laws. Many scientists  and philosophers  have been explicit in their belief that biological 
explanations  should be mechanistic (Ayala 1970) and/or naturalistic (Neander 1995). They want to 
naturalize biology. 
Stars can be viewed as  gravity powered engines  that lower entropy locally. Could life be viewed as  a 
preference-producing engine? Energy has been trapped in a complex chemical system as  it runs down. 
Gravity powered stars  produce photons as  a waste product. Biospheres  trap the energy of the photons  in 
osmotic gradients  and reducing power (NADPH, NADH, and ATP). Preference arises  for whatever 
maintains the system, making stars and life equally eddies in the universal movement toward heat death.
This approach shows promise, but mostly shifts  the probem from difficult metaphysical questions  (What 
is  life? Is  life a natural kind?...) to difficult theoretical questions in biology (What constitutes  an individual? 
What are the units  of selection? How do short term and long term fitness  relate?...) or difficult 
thermodynamic questions  (How does one objectively bound an organism? What differentiates biological and 
abiological complexity?...). This analysis  suggests that the way forward, should reductionism be the accepted 
approach, will require explicit regularization and mathematical reduction of the currently ambiguous 
concepts  of biological fitness  and efficiency. Mathematical models of feedback loops  look promising. Muller 
(1926, 914) suggested that “autocatalysis” was a feedback process  long before Wright (1976) offered it in 
philosophical treatments of  function. For modern commentary, see Tsokolov (2010) and Bechtel (2011).
For both evolutionary and metabolic definitions, concrete models have been proposed, but they rest on 
premises  that are not shared among all biologists. These premises  are related to preference and the end of 
functional regresses. For evolutionary definitions, Alan Grafen (1999, 2014) is  working on a mathematical 
formalism to capture fitness, but it takes  individuals  as  the beneficiaries  or “maximizing agents” following 
the trend set by R.A. Fisher and appearing frequently in etiological explanations  of function. David Haig 
(2012, 2014) criticizes  this  approach, drawing on the concept of genes  as  the beneficiaries  while invoking 
types  and tokens. Birch (2014) has  added questions  about intrinsic versus  extrinsic properties and what 
exactly it means  to optimize the individual. That represents only one such controversy from the past year. 
For metabolic definitions, Sara Walker has tried to mathematically characterize top-down causation and 
information control in a way that would objectively reduce self-regulation (Walker and Davies  2013; Walker 
et al. 2012). She has  also run into difficulties  formalizing an objective metric. Once again there is  a long 
history of  formalisms, but none have been commonly accepted.
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Approach Preference Benefits Costs
Vitalism
Comes from a life-specific 
force or particle
Historical, provides real 
objective preferences Does not match the data
Reductionism
Is reducible to interactions 
of  general physical 
forces and particles
Consistent with the data and 
other branches of  science, 
parsimonious, provides concrete 
programs of  research
Reduction of  “fitness” 
and “efficiency” require 
currently unavailable 
formalisms, risks alienating 
folk and scientific definitions 
of  “preference” and “life”
Instrumentalism
Is useful in common discourse, but 
is not objective
Allows continued variety 
and subjective usage 
in productive science
Provides no explanatory 
value - proper activity 
and life fail as 
scientific categories
Table 3 — Three Approaches to Preference in Biology. See text for discussion.
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It is  not enough to claim that reduction is  possible. One must provide a model by which the properties 
we wish to explain can be reduced without loss of explanatory power. Biologists  in 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s 
all claimed that artificial life was just around the corner, but these predictions have not been borne out.
Can scientists  and the general public accept this  reduction? Are we willing to reduce the concept of 
biological preference to the products  of natural selection (or metabolism)? If we do, are we then willing to 
reduce other forms  of preference to biological preference or do we want to invoke some kind of human 
preference added on top? I’m not really comfortable with either option. Many philosophers  appear 
convinced that “function” in psychology and sociology can be reduced to biological “function” and that 
biological “function” can be reduced to natural selection. Let us  assume they are correct. Within the strict 
confines of evolutionary theory, I believe that Ernst Mayr’s  solution is  generally accepted. Proximal 
teleonomy (proper activity or function) is  a product of natural selection. Natural selection is  not teleological 
(goal-driven) or even teleonomic (having a proper function) according to Mayr (1961), but it produces 
functional genetic programs. Mayr rejects  cosmic teleology (1992), but I believe he would accept some form 
of teleonomy for the set of life on Earth. In discussing the definition of life, we must consider the possibility 
that all Earth life has a joint activity, range, and preference. If Darwin problematized the variety/species 
distinction, can we not also problematize the species/biosphere distinction and speak of a proper activity for 
the biosphere? Monod and Dennett both come close to making this  suggestion. It seems the inevitable 
outcome of reductionism. All function and purpose, including our desire for good models, are simply the 
product of  natural selection, at least from the scientific perspective,.
The reductionist approach makes  sickness  nothing more than a maladaptive condition or a more rapid 
dissipation of energy. Such a definition, while scientifically tractable, presents  challenges  for ethics  and other 
branches  of philosophy. We run the risk of separating the scientific and public discourses, as  is the case for 
altruism, whose biological definition is now radically different from its popular and ethical definition. 
Explicit reasoning about the distal end of the process  would help resolve the question. We might 
constrain an evolutionary definition with a preference for increased overall biomass  involved in a lineage or 
increased total number of copies  of a gene set. Likewise, we could constrain a metabolic definition with a 
value for higher potential energy trapped in a system. These need not be the preferences  we choose, but if 
they exist implicitly in the definition, we would benefit from explicitly discussing them. They have 
consequences beyond biology, including whether stars are classified as alive.
5.2.3 Instrumentalism
There could be no objective concept of preference. It may be that life is  not a natural category, only a 
useful concept for describing the activity of organisms. Biologists  frequently invoke helpful idealizations  with 
terms that defy strict definition. The term “species” provides a classic example. While the biological species 
concept (species reflect populations  that do or may interbreed) has  been very useful in studying plants  and 
animals, it admits  of multiple counterexamples  (e.g., ring species  and hybrids) and simply does  not apply to 
the vast majority of organisms, which do not reproduce sexually. As  a more common example, “chair” 
remains a useful way of describing pieces  of furniture, despite the fact that clear differentiae cannot be 
produced that will unfailing identify all chairs  and non-chairs. Perhaps life is  simply a useful way of 
describing a collection of objects  and processes  on Earth. McLaughlin (2001, 213) reflects  that many 
biologists  remain Kantian in their approach. Even if psychology and biology were reducible to biology and 
biology to natural selection, our concept of  natural selection itself  may not be objective.
A consciously instrumentalist approach would be transparent about our subjective use of preference in 
differentiating complex phenomena of biological interest (e.g., humans) from other complex phenomena 
(e.g., stars, flames, computer viruses). We could say that life represents  systems  in which we attribute 
preference regardless  of whether the preference exists  objectively. This  would explain the fluid boundaries  of 
biology as  a discipline. It would prove extremely unsatisfying, however, when it comes  to questions  of the 
extent, origins, and purposes  of life, which have attracted great interest. The term could no longer be 
invoked as an explanation for some observation or to compel some conclusion.
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6. Conclusion
Different people ask questions  for different reasons. What work is  a “definition of life” meant to do? 
Why do we care? What is  it about life, however we define it, that impacts  the way we live and the way we do 
science? Cleland (2012) has  argued that no comprehensive definition of life is  possible because the sample 
size is  1. But we are interested in alien life because of some meaning life holds  for us here on Earth. What we 
are looking for is  not an abstract form of knowledge, but concrete entities, living elsewhere, that have similar 
meaning. Astrobiology at least demands  an operational definition of life, so we can go looking for it, but also 
an understanding of  the role of  Earth life in human understanding, so we know what we are looking for.
A definition of life that will satisfy both a scientific and a general audience will need to capture the 
concepts  of sickness  and health in a way consistent with the mechanical philosophy. The two popular 
definitions  of life, evolutionary and metabolic, attempt to solve the problem with an activity specific to living 
things. I have argued that this  kind of activity is  not enough. Such definitions  also include some notion of 
preference attached to the activity, a preference not fully realized in sick or broken individuals. I propose the 
“proper activity criterion” as a diagnostic tool. If you can imagine a dysfunctional version of it, then it must 
be evidence of life (either a living thing or the product of a living thing). As  a diagnostic, it is  purely 
instrumental.
In order to advance the conversation, I also suggest adopting a three-part scheme for understanding 
definitions  of life. This  scheme includes  a binary, a range, and a preference. In the examples  covered here, 
the binary is  an activity with a range of operation. Preference weights  one end of the range with some 
significance lacking at the other end. Once all three elements are explicit, we can ask what type of value we 
are looking for and whether it is  compatible with our philosophy. Vitalism, reductionism, and 
instrumentalism all provide rational approaches  to the problem (although vitalism appears  disproven by the 
evidence). By spelling out the consequences  of these various  definitions and approaches, I think we can find 
a common definition of life, or at least identify the underlying philosophical divides  that make a common 
definition currently impossible.
Although I do not regard my own views  as  contributing directly to this  central thesis, I briefly describe 
them here in the interest of transparency. With regard to definitions  of life, I believe evolutionary definitions 
hold the most promise with imperfect replication as the activity. I have no trouble imagining a process 
occurring and producing “functions” at multiple levels from gene to population. I fear that there are no 
satisfactory answers to four, seemingly subjective questions. First, what do we mean by “imperfect”? Perfect 
replication does not lead to variation and subsequent selection. How close an entity needs  to come to enter 
into natural selection and over what time scale requires  clarification. Second, I do not understand how we 
might differentiate between self-replication and co-replication. Cellular phones  represent a tremendously 
successful type with variation and selection. How do we differentiate between them, engineered sterile 
strains  of corn, and the human “replicators” which engineer both? Third, I see increased biomass  (excluding 
technology), increased mass  devoted to a proper activity (including technology), and increased copy number 
as  three different ends  of “fitness” optimization. I cannot see how all three can be reconciled into one 
objective metric of fitness. Fourth, I do not see how to mathematically reduce short term and long term 
fitness into a single metric.
I suspect that sufficient rigor is  impossible with regard to metabolic definitions  of life, which strike me as 
even more subjective than their evolutionary cousins. To the best of my knowledge, all measures  of 
complexity or information content that do not invoke intentional considerations  must include stars  and 
possibly planets  within the category of life. Shannon entropy, for example, depends  upon alphabet size. 
There is  no objective way to determine whether a more concise alphabet could exist, making the value 
dependent upon the individuals attempting to code and decode a message.
With regard to reductionism and instrumentalism, I see the former as  a hope for the future and the latter 
as  a present necessity until the questions  above have been reasonably answered. My hope for this  paper is 
that it will encourage more concrete discussions  around those issues  whose resolution is necessary for 
reductionism to be a viable option.
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Notes
1. For more on attributed, natural, and essential activities as they relate to definitions of life, see Varela and 
Maturana (1972), Sober (1993), Kitcher (1993), Bedau (2010), and Shields (2012).
2. I am not making the general claim that all scientific definitions of life correspond to “sickness” definitions, only 
these two (i.e., metabolic and evolutionary). Systematic lists of all such definitions often include biochemical and 
syndrome definitions as well (e.g., Cleveland and Chyba 2007, 120). Biochemical definitions may lack sensitivity 
and selectivity, and therefore have not been popular as  operational definitions.  Abiotic complex organic molecules 
have been found in meteorites and alien life may not be organic.  Syndrome definitions provide lists of life 
symptoms rather than an essential character (e.g, Koshland 2002). They are not ideal definitions and the 
symptoms always  include replication and metabolism. Thus, evolutionary and metabolic definitions provide a 
good starting place for analysis.
3. In general, I have avoided careful distinctions between the terms reproduction and replication. Attempts have 
been made to separate them on several grounds.  Dyson (1985) suggests  that replication produces identical copies 
while reproduction does  not. Common usage does  not follow this pattern; DNA replication is  not perfect,  nor 
would DNA reproduction sound right.  Nor does  the increase in entropy allow for perfect copies without infinite 
energy. All forms of copying introduce errors at some level. Millikan (1984) suggests reproduction be re-tasked 
specifically for copies of types. Others restrict reproduction to organisms and replication to everything else. Both 
of  these short-circuit the discussion at hand.
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